Michael Krepon, “Fifteen years later,” The Express Tribune News Network, 26 December 2013

India and Pakistan have travelled a long distance since testing nuclear devices in 1998. Back then, government officials and leading strategic thinkers on the subcontinent expressed confidence that these tests would have stabilising effects. Going public with the Bomb would relieve anxieties and facilitate diplomatic efforts to normalise relations. In countries where many lived in poverty that placed a premium on economic growth, all that was needed was minimum, credible deterrence.  It’s worth recalling these aspirations 15 years later, during which Pakistan and India have fought one limited war and have experienced two severe crises. Their nuclear arsenals have grown steadily as diplomacy has faltered.

… General K Sundarji, India’s most daring military strategist was also wrong when he wrote that, “A mutual minimum nuclear deterrent will act as a stabilising factor.” Air Commodore Jasjit Singh felt similarly. He predicted that, “Deterrence will continue, but on a higher level. I don’t think we are going to see a slide toward instability.”

Pakistan’s strategic analysts were in agreement. General KM Arif forecast that “The nuclear option will promote regional peace and create stability”.  …

These high hopes were based on false premises. Optimists discounted domestic politics and institutions pushing for more bombs and better ways to deliver them. The abstract notion of minimum, credible deterrence had little chance against growing threat perceptions. Another false premise was that diplomatic success could be midwifed by devices with horrific destructive powers. …

A third false premise was that diplomacy could somehow be given a sustainable boost, just because of the Bomb. … So far, those who have sought reconciliation have been easily trumped by others who have sought military advantage under the nuclear umbrella or the disruption of diplomatic initiatives. …

Since the 1998 tests, India and Pakistan have together flight-tested 17 types of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.  Not all of these missiles will actually carry nuclear warheads and missile types will be consolidated over time. But by any reckoning, 17 is a very large number — one that makes a mockery of the promises made in 1998 to pursue minimum, credible deterrence.

Read the full article here.